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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent's Brief in its statement of the case (p.4) has 
misstatements as follows: 
It states that as a finding of f a<. i.
 ; the lower court found 
"that the Air Terminal note contained other powers which negated 
negotiability". It made no such finding. It merely made a 
conclusion of law that "it contains other rights". This court is 
not bound by the lower court's conclusions of law. On appeal, 
any conclusion of law of the lower court may be reviewed de novo. 
Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 US 1, 86 S. Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 
(1966). Nor should the lower court's construction of a written 
instrument even be persuasive. Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk 
321 P.2d 221 (UT 1958). Lake v. Hermes Associates 552 P.2d 126 
(UT 1976). Arnold Machinery Co. *. Balls 624 P2d 678, footnote 9 
(UT I9r Buehner Block v. UWC Associates 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 
(UT 1988). The security agreement, not the note contained other 
powers. 
Respondent states as a finding of fact that the lower court 
found that "First Federal was aware under the applicable statute 
of a limitation in the companion agreement". There is no such 
finding and there is no limitation. 
Respondent states as a finding of fact that the lower court 
found that First Federal was aware "of a claim against the Air 
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Terminal note". There is no such finding and there is no such 
claim (R. 498-501). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In paragraphs 13 and 14 of Respondent's statement of facts 
(ps. 7,8) it is stated that the two subsequent notes executed by 
Gump & Ayers to First Federal "replaced" prior notes. The court 
found in findings of fact numbers 14 and 16 that said notes were 
"renewal" notes (R. 479). 
ARGUMENT 
The Note Does Not "Contain" Any Additional 
Promises Other Than to Pay Money 
Air Terminal correctly states that the promissory note to be 
negotiable must contain no additional promise other than a pro-
mise to pay money. Air Terminal's argument that the note 
"contains" additional promises because it makes reference to the 
security agreement for additional rights is untenable. It is the 
separate security agreement which contains any additional rights, 
not the note. Air Terminal's argument is specifically negated by 
the official comment on UCC § 3-119(2) which states: 
Subsection (2) rejects decisions which 
have carried the rule that contemporaneous 
writings must be read together to the length 
of holding that a clause in a mortgage 
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affecting a note destroyed the negotiability 
of the note. The negotiability of an instru-
ment is always to be determined by what 
appears on the face of the instrument alone, 
and if it is negotiable in itself a purchaser 
without notice of a separate writing is in no 
way affected by it. If the instrument itself 
states that it is subject to or governed by 
any other agreement, it is not negotiable 
under this Article; but if it merely refers to 
a separate agreement or states that it arises 
out of such an agreement, it is negotiable. 
(Emphasis added). 
The above quoted official comment specifically rejects deci-
sions construing contemporaneous written documents together when 
the question is the negotiability of the document, even though 
otherwise the documents would be construed together. The cases 
cited in our original brief so hold. The note is therefore a 
negotiable instrument. 
There Were no Limitations in The Separate 
Agreement of The Rights Under The Note 
First Federal was aware of the terms of the contemporaneous 
agreement, but it was also aware of the fact that there were just 
additional powers contained in the security agreement and not 
limitations on the terms of the promissory note. 
Air Terminal argues that under the security agreement 
Sunayers had a duty to indemnify Air Terminal against the Morse 
problem. Air Terminal then concludes that this indemnification 
agreement is a limitation on the rights of First Federal under 
the note and that therefore, First Federal cannot be a holder in 
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due course. Such an argument is fallacious because First Federal 
did not assume any obligations of Sunayers or Gump & Ayers under 
the security agreement. First Federal therefore is not liable on 
the indemnification agreement. 6 Am. Jur.2d Assignments §109. 
Nor could Air Terminal offset against First Federal an indem-
nification claim that may arise against Sunayers or Gump & Ayers. 
20 Am. Jur.2d Counterclaim Recoupment and Setoff §89. Air 
Terminal would have a right to enforce the indemnification 
agreement against Sunayers or Gump & Ayers but not against First 
Federal whether the note is negotiable or whether it isn't. The 
indemnification is not a limitation and the note is therefore 
negotiable. 
Furthermore 70A-3-119 relied upon by Air Terminal for its 
argument that a limitation in the separate agreement negates the 
status of First Federal as a holder in due course does not sup-
port such a contention. It provides: 
70A-3-119 
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any 
transferee the terms of an instrument may be modified or 
affected by any other written agreement executed as a 
part of the same transaction, except that a holder in 
due course is not affected by any limitation of his 
rights arising out of the separate written agreement if 
he had no notice of the limitation when he took the 
instrument. 
(2) A separate agreement does not affect the negotiability 
of an instrument. 
Subsection (1) does not provide that knowledge of any limita-
tion in a separate agreement makes the instrument non-negotiable. 
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In fact, subsection (2) provides expressly that a separate 
agreement does not affect negotiability. Also, subsection (1) 
does not provide that if there is a limitation that that makes 
the holder with knowledge thereof not a holder in due course. 
The language of 70A-3-119(l) assumes that one is a holder in due 
course even though there may be notice of a limitation. Since it 
provides that a holder in due course is only affected if he had 
notice, subsection (1) assumes that he is a holder in due course, 
whether or not he had notice. 
The determination of whether one is a holder in due course is 
set forth in 70A-3-302(l) which provides: 
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instru-
ment 
(a) for value; and 
(b) in good faith; and 
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been 
dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it 
on the part of any person. 
That says nothing about any knowledge of a limitation. 
First Federal Had No Notice of a Claim or Defense 
Air Terminal argues that First Federal is not a holder in due 
course because it had notice of a claim or defense that its obli-
gation under the note is voidable. It argues that it is voidable 
because of the "Morse problem", and that under 70A-3-304(1)(b) 
First Federal is not a holder in due course. That section provi-
des : 
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(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if. . . 
(b) The purchaser has notice that the obligation of any 
party is voidable in whole or in part. . . 
The note says nothing about the Morse problem. The security 
agreement provides only that Air Terminal will be indemnified by 
Sunayers and Gump & Ayers against any reduction in the share of 
the capital, net income, net loss or cash available for distribu-
tion to which Sunayers partnership interest would be entitled 
based upon any claims against the partnership by Morse (section 
12 of the security agreement). That provision is strictly an 
indemnification and gives no right whatsoever of avoidance of 
either the note or the security agreement. Therefore, there is 
no claim or defense that the obligation was voidable. First 
Federal is a holder in due course. 
Air Terminal next relies upon 70A-3-304(2) which provides: 
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instru-
ment when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has nego-
tiated the instrument in payment of or as security for 
his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit 
or otherwise in breach of duty. 
The quotation used at page 17 of Air Terminal's brief con-
veniently omits the last phrase "or otherwise in breach of duty". 
Obviously if the fiduciary Gump & Ayers has not violated any 
fiduciary duty, the fact that some of the proceeds were used to 
pay a legitimate debt from Sunayers to its general partner Gump & 
Ayers would be irrelevant. The above quoted subsection (2) is 
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inapplicable because of the last phrase "or otherwise in breach 
of duty". Not only did First Federal not have notice of a claim 
against the instrument but also there was and is no claim. 
Therefore, First Federal is a holder in due course. 
Furthermore, 70A-3-304(l) which defines a claim or defense 
would necessarily exclude a situation in which no claim or 
defense is asserted. Such is the situation here because Gump & 
Ayers was entitled to retain that portion of the proceeds of the 
loan it obtained. Not only was there no breach of fiduciary duty 
by Gump & Ayers, the general partner of Sunayers, Gump & Ayers 
put its own credit on the line to help the partnership obtain the 
financing it needed to pay off obligations, including that of the 
partnership to Gump & Ayers. 
Air Terminal misstates the position of First Federal when Air 
Terminal at page 18 of its brief states that First Federal con-
tends that "Sunayers, and not Gump & Ayers, was the debtor" on 
the note to First Federal. Air Terminal asserts that Gump & 
Ayers, and not Sunayers, is liable on the note to First Federal 
and therefore, Sunayers was not the "debtor". That assertion is 
correct, but all First Federal is arguing is that the loan from 
First Federal to Gump & Ayers was made to cover "debts" of 
Sunayers on its Sunflower project and that because the proceeds 
were so used, there was no breach of fiduciary duty by Gump & 
Ayers. 
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"Claim" and "Defense" Are Not Synonymous 
In the sense used here, "claim" connotes an affirmative 
assertion of a right, whereas "defense" connotes opposition to 
the assertion of such claim. Had the terms been synonymous the 
commercial code would not have used both terms in some instances 
and only one in others. The fact that in one situation it uses 
defense or claim and in another reverses the order to claim or 
defense is no indication that they are synonymous. 
70A-3-304 defines the notice referred to in 70A-3-302 in 
defining a holder in due course as "a holder who takes the 
instrument without notice. . .of any defense against or claim to 
it on the part of any person". 70A-3-302 provides: 
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instru-
ment. • • 
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been 
dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it 
on the part of any person. (Emphasis added). 
As set forth in our prior brief, there is a differentiation 
between notice of claim or defense as defined in 70A-3-304 sub-
section (1) and notice of claim against the instrument as defined 
in subsection (2). It provides: 
70A-3-304 
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if 
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible 
evidence of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise 
so irregular as to call into question Its validity, 
terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to 
the party to pay; or 
(b) The purchaser has notice that the obligation of any 
party is voidable in whole or in part, or that all 
parties have been discharged. 
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instru-
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ment when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has nego-
tiated the instrument in payment of or as security for 
his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit 
or otherwise in breach of duty. 
Air Terminal argues that 70A-3-306(d) uses interchangeably 
"claim" and "defense" and that therefore, they are synonymous. 
That section provides: 
70A-3-306 
Rights of one not holder in due course. Unless he has the 
rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instru-
ment subject to. . . 
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds 
the instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or 
satisfaction to such holder would be inconsistent with 
the terms of a restrictive indorsement. The claim of 
any third person to the instrument is not otherwise 
available as a defense to any party liable thereon 
unless the third person himself defends the action for 
such party. (Emphasis added). 
There is no such interchangeable use. That section states that 
the claim of a third person to the instrument is not available as 
a defense to a different party. 
The significance of a differentiation is that Air Terminal is 
wrongfully asserting that there was notice of a claim against the 
instrument because Gump & Ayers negotiated the instrument for its 
own benefit and thus, it is asserted, under 70A-3-304 First 
Federal could not be a holder in due course. As stated above, 
the negotiation was not in breach of a fiduciary duty, so that 
argument fails. But even if that were a valid argument, First 
Federal would still be a holder in due course because there is no 
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claim against the instrument by Sunayers or anyone else under 
70A-3-304(2). 
Also 70A-3-306(d), the very statute Air Terminal cites as 
using "claim" and "defense" interchangeably, bars Air Terminal 
from raising the defense. In this situation Sunayers is the only 
third person who could assert a claim to the instrument. Not 
only is Sunayers not asserting a "claim to the instrument", Air 
Terminal cannot assert a defense "unless the third person himself 
defends the action for such party" which Sunayers has not done. 
Thus, the wording of 70A-3-306(d) that "the claim of any third 
person to the instrument is not otherwise available as a defense 
to any party liable thereon unless the third person himself 
defends the action for such party" bars Air Terminal from 
asserting a defense regardless of whether or not First Federal is 
a holder in due course. 
First Federal Did Not "Close Its Eyes" 
Air Terminal argues that First Federal closed its eyes to 
apparent defenses. Presumably, it is referring to what it pre-
viously asserted, that the note was voidable or that Gump & Ayers 
as a partner in Sunayers benefitted from the proceeds of the 
First Federal loan. Both of these are untenable as discussed 
above. Hence, there is no basis for the contention that First 
Federal "closed its eyes". 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether or not the Air Terminal note meets the requirements 
of the commercial code for being a negotiable instrument depends 
upon the terms on the face of the note. The terms of the 
security agreement do not appear on the face of the note and 
therefore, do not destroy its negotiability. 
First Federal is a holder in due course because it had no 
notice of any defense or claim. 
There is no contention by Air Terminal that First Federal had 
any notice of the alleged fraud which Air Terminal asserts as a 
defense. Air Terminal should not be able to assert that fraud as 
a defense against First Federal. 
The ruling of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this i~)#L day of May, 1988. 
/s/ John W. Lowe 
John W. Lowe 
Attorney for Appellant 
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